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Abstract
The effective management and response to either volcanic eruptions or
(often prolonged) periods of heightened unrest, is fundamentally depen-
dent upon effective relationships and communication between science
advisors, emergency managers and key decision makers. To optimise the
effectiveness of the scientiﬁc contribution to effective prediction and
management decision making, it is important for science advisors or
scientiﬁc advisory bodies to be cognisant of the many different
perspectives, needs and goals of the diverse organisations involved in
the response. Challenges arise for scientists as they may need to be
embedded members of the wider response multi-agency team, rather than
independent contributors of essential information. Thus they must add to
their competencies an understanding of the different roles, responsibilities,
and needs of each member organisation, such that they can start to provide
information implicitly rather than in response to explicit requests. To build
this shared understanding, the team situational awareness (understanding
of the situation in time and space), and the wider team mental model
(a representation of the team functions and responsibilities), requires
participating in a response environment together. Facilitating the avail-
ability of this capability has training and organizational development
implications for scientiﬁc agencies and introduces a need for developing
new inter-agency relationships and liaison mechanisms well before a
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volcanic crisis occurs. In this chapter, we review individual and team
decision making, and the role of situational awareness and mental models
in creating “shared meaning” between agencies. The aim is to improve
communication and information sharing, as well as furthering the
understanding of the impact that uncertainty has upon communication
and ways to manage this. We then review personal and organisational
factors that can impact response and conclude with a brief review of
methods available to improve future response capability, and the
importance of protocols and guidelines to assist this in a national or
international context.
1 Introduction
Whether it involves a period of unrest (e.g., Long
Valley, CA in 1982), an ongoing eruption (e.g.,
Soufrière Hills Volcano, WI), or responding to a
blue sky eruption (e.g., Ruapehu, NZ, 2007; Mt
Ontake, Japan, 2014), the response to complex
volcanic crises requires the coordinated and
complementary contributions of numerous orga-
nizations and agencies. The degree to which this
can effectively be achieved depends on whether
the quality and degree of relationship and net-
work building conducted before, during, and
after, a crisis can facilitate the shared under-
standing required for communicated information
to enhance effective decision making.
The challenge in this task is twofold. The ﬁrst
relates to the need to bring representatives from
diverse sources together (Paton et al. 1998;
Doyle et al. 2015), including technical advisors
(such as geologists, geophysicists, engineers, and
social scientists), emergency management (civil
defence, ﬁre service, police, army, national and
local government), lifeline organisations (lifeli-
nes companies, transport, water), as well as
community organisations and special interest
groups (e.g. neighbourhood support and volun-
teer groups, Rotary, Lions club, etc.). A major
challenge to developing effective crisis manage-
ment arises because these representatives bring
with them different objectives, priorities and
interpretive and operational beliefs (Paton et al.
1998; Doyle et al. 2015). The second task is thus
how to facilitate the ability of these representa-
tives to collaborate and share knowledge in order
to effectively respond to a crisis.
Recognition of the diverse consequences
volcanic crises create can result in organisations
appreciating why they need to be part of a
multi-agency group response. However, this
appreciation does not automatically translate into
acceptance of either the need to develop new
roles and responsibilities, or that crisis response
goals may need to be reconciled with the political
or economic pressures that each representative
brings with them to the crisis response environ-
ment. A further challenge to the scientiﬁc com-
munity arises from the need for some of them to
be embedded members of the wider response
multi-agency team, rather than independent
contributors of essential information. For exam-
ple, to enhance interagency communications
during recent hazard events and exercises in NZ,
members of the GNS Science team were situated
as liaison ofﬁcers within the Emergency Opera-
tions Centre (EOC) and responded within the
emergency management team itself. In addition,
the crisis response context can introduce a need
to deal with demands that would rarely, if ever,
be encountered in routine work contexts and that
can elevate levels of stress and interfere with
decision making.
The atypical demands that can impair response
during a disaster were evident in evaluation of
the multi-agency response to the Ruapehu
1995–1996 eruptions. These demands included:
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intense media interest or public scrutiny, resource
availability and adequacy, co-ordination prob-
lems, a lack of deﬁned responsibility for
co-ordination of response, inadequate communi-
cation with other organisations, conflict between
agencies, and inadequate and changing role def-
inition (Paton 1996; Paton et al. 1998, 1999)
(Table 1). The IAVCEI Subcommittee for Crisis
Protocols (IAVCEI 1999) provides additional
examples of problems commonly experienced in
volcanological response (see Table 2), each of
which correspond to the disaster stressors identi-
ﬁed by Paton (1996; see Table 1).
While some potential event-related stressors
reflect the dynamics of hazard impacts (e.g.,
volcanic ash affecting communication infras-
tructure), others reflect inadequacies in crisis
communication systems and the expertise avail-
able to use them (Paton et al. 1998, 1999;
Johnston et al. 1999). In the absence of the
development of appropriate crisis management
procedures and training in crisis management,
which is the norm, the associated negative reac-
tions can detrimentally affect performance and
decision making (e.g., physiological and
psychological symptoms of anxiety and fear,
“tunnel vision”, failure to prioritise, “freezing”
and loss of concentration; Flin 1996; Flin et al.
1997; Klein 1997; Paton et al. 1999). It thus
becomes important to identify the management
systems and procedures, and personal and team
capabilities, required to facilitate effective
multi-agency response and use this to inform the
training needs and training strategies adopted in
all response agencies. Evaluation of previous
volcanic crisis management experiences can
provide a good starting point for this process.
Mitigating these issues prior to a crisis, par-
ticularly at the science:decision-maker interface
is important, as effective multi-organisational
management needs to be built on “consensus
about task goals and priorities; co-operation and
team framework; a sense of group identity; a
strong sense of community within the organiza-
tion; and the breakdown of bureaucracy and
formalities” (Paton et al. 1999, p. 17). Address-
ing these issues requires an appreciation of how a
shared understanding of response needs can be
achieved prior to a crisis, such that this
multi-organisational, multi-level, multi-team
Table 1 Potential stressors that negatively impact on response capability and personal and team performance when
responding to or managing crisis events and disasters (after Paton 1996)
• Degree of warning or change in conditions (low warning times or rapid change increases physical and psychological
demands)
• Degree of uncertainty from event and organizational sources
• Time of day (stress greater at night and when having to respond at the end of a working day)
• Presence of traumatic stimuli (such as sensationalised news coverage)
• Lack of opportunity for effective action (attributions about perceived response failure can be internalised rather than
more accurately attributed to environmental factors outside of their control)
• Knowing victims or families
• Intense media interest or public scrutiny directed at event management and those responsible
• Higher than usual or expected responsibility
• Higher than usual physical, time and emotional demands (including cumulative stress over time)
• Contact with those affected
• Resource availability and adequacy (and how these change over time)
• Co-ordination problems
• Conflict between agencies
• Inadequate and changing role deﬁnition
• Inappropriate leadership practices
• Single versus multiple threats
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Table 2 Common problems of professional interaction of volcanologists during crises, as identiﬁed in the IAVCEI
subcommittee for crisis protocols (IAVCEI 1999)
Problem Detail
Poor communication and teamwork
among scientists
• Failure to value diverse scientiﬁc expertise, approach, and experience
• Overselling of new methods
• Failure to honour prior work on a volcano, and, in the reverse direction,
failure to share study opportunities
• Failure to share information and scarce logistical resources
• Failure to work as a single scientiﬁc team, and thus loss of potential
synergism, i.e., loss of a cooperative result that is greater than the sum of
individual results
• Failure of scientists to use a single voice for public statements
• Failure of science-funding agencies, job supervisors, and promotion
panels to give full credit for self-sacriﬁce and teamwork during volcanic
crises
Leadership problems • Leaders without leadership skills
• Failure of leaders to recognize the limits of their own technical expertise
• Confusion about team roles, policies, and procedures
• Failure to encourage those who can and wish to help
• Failure to develop (a) respect for scientiﬁc differences within a team,
(b) a method for developing consensus, and (c) a means for
acknowledging differences that cannot be resolved
• Failure to balance risk and rewards of dangerous ﬁeld work
• Failure to recognize and minimize fatigue
Issues for visiting scientists, invited
and uninvited
• Scientists who arrive at a crisis without invitation
• Invitations from other than the primary scientiﬁc team, e.g., from a
competing or peripheral local group
• Unilateral foreign funding decisions
• Cultural differences regarding scientiﬁc discussion and decision making
• Public statements by visiting scientists
• Pre-emption of research and publication opportunities by visitors, while
local scientists are still busy managing the crisis
Unwise and unwelcome warnings • Warnings from pseudo-scientists
• Warnings or forecasts from scientists from other ﬁelds
• Warnings or forecasts by volcanologists working in isolation, either
on-site or far from the volcano in question
• Exaggerated statements of risk, or, conversely, overly reassuring
statements about safety of an area when signiﬁcant risk exists
• Outdated warnings or forecasts in need of change
Poor communication between
scientists and public ofﬁcials
• Unfamiliarity with each other’s needs and expectations, methods,
expertise, and limits
• A conscious decision to withhold or delay some hazards information
• Ofﬁcial scepticism of scientiﬁc advice
• Procedural failures in communication with public ofﬁcials:
– Failure to put warnings in writing, for clarity and later accountability
– Failure to distribute warnings to all key parties. Failure to establish a
clear “chain of communication” between scientists, public ofﬁcials, and
external agencies such as civil deﬁnes
– Failure to conﬁrm that ofﬁcials truly understand our warnings
Ineffective relations with news media • Inadequate interaction with the news media
• Premature or excessive interaction with the news media
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response is managed effectively, and how com-
munication impacts the quality of decision
making. In lieu of real events, these capabilities
can be developed through shared exercises, sce-
nario planning, and other relationship building
activities, which have training and organizational
development implications for scientiﬁc agencies.
In this chapter we review the fundamentals of
decision making at the individual, team,
multi-team, organisational and agency levels
(Sect. 2), by drawing on psychological and criti-
cal incident management research. We review the
concepts of mental models, which are an indi-
vidual’s representation of a situation such as a
response environment including needs, responsi-
bilities, and interdependencies; or a representation
of a system such as volcanic unrest which incor-
porates their internal, personalised, experiential,
and contextual understanding of how the volcanic
system operates. We discuss how these mental
models contribute to a “shared meaning” between
agencies (Sect. 3), and how that relates to com-
munication and information sharing; as well as the
impact that uncertainty has upon communication
and ways to manage this. We then review a
number of personal and organisational factors that
can impact response (Sect. 4), and conclude (in
Sect. 5) with a brief review of the methods
available to enhance response, and the importance
of protocols and guidelines to assist this in a
national or international context. Throughout this
chapter we focus on the response phase of a crisis.
There are however many other complementary
approaches to enhance risk communication with
communities living with volcanic risk, which we
do not consider here, including community-based
disaster risk management and other participatory
techniques (see review in Barclay et al. 2008; and
also Williams and Dunn 2003; Cronin et al. 2004;
Gaillard 2006; Cadag and Gaillard 2014).
2 Introducing Decision Making
During a volcanic crisis, several decision making
styles and processes are required. Decision
making itself has been studied extensively across
a range of ﬁelds. Here we focus on those
supported through research in crisis and risk
management contexts (Lipshitz et al. 2001;
Doyle and Johnston 2011).
2.1 Individual Processing Systems
Considering ﬁrst the processes occurring at an
individual level, the ﬁeld of psychology offers us
understanding of the theory of two “parallel
processing systems” (Epstein 1994; Sloman
1996; Chaiken and Trope 1999; Slovic et al.
2004). The ﬁrst, known as either Type 1 or the
affective processing system, involves rapid,
unconscious, action-oriented processing, and
results in people interpreting risk as an emotional
state or feeling (e.g., fear, dread, anxiety; Epstein
1994; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2004;
Doyle et al. 2014b), and can thus reduce or
increase risk perceptions. These are assumed to
be the default response “unless intervened by
distinctive higher order” Type 2 processes (Evans
and Stanovich 2013a), or analytical processing
systems (Epstein 1994), which heavily load
working memory, and utilise hypothetical think-
ing, more deliberate computational cognitive
processes (and thus longer decision times). These
are learnt processes that apply rules and proce-
dures (algorithms, normative rules and logic) to
the analyses of data and to justify actions (i.e., to
respond to demands rather than reacting to them).
As of Doyle et al. (2014b, p. 78) we consider
that “the adoption of the affective and analytical
processing systems [is] not an either-or situation,
but rather a more complex balancing act influ-
enced by the degree of uncertainty or threat in the
decision context, and … relative experiences”
(Keren and Schul 2009; Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer 2011; Evans and Stanovich 2013a, b;
Keren 2013; Osman 2013; Thompson 2013).
Thus, if time permits, scientists tend to adopt the
analytical process due to their formal training in
data analysis and decision making. Meanwhile,
non-scientists adopt a more affective process
dependent upon prior experience, time pressures
and operating procedures. However, when sci-
entists are called upon to respond to atypical
demands (particularly in a multi-agency context),
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if there are no formal or procedural rules to abide
by, the affective system usually prevails
(Loewenstein et al. 2001) and decision making
effectiveness is compromised as a result (Weber
2006). Mitigating this problem calls for all those
interacting in decision making to receive training
which develops competency in different decision
making styles, and, importantly, practice using
them in simulated and actual crisis events.
2.2 Incident Management
and Naturalistic Decision
Making
The analytical (or Type 2) decision making has
been identiﬁed as having four steps (Flin 1996,
p. 141–142): (1) identifying the problem;
(2) generating a set of options; (3) evaluating
these options; (4) implementing the preferred
option (Saaty 2008). However, this assumes a
‘perfect’ environment. In reality, most decisions
are made in uncertain ‘naturalistic settings’
deﬁned by: ill-structured problems; uncertain
dynamic environments; shifting, ill-deﬁned, or
competing goals; action/feedback loops; time
stress; high stakes; multiple players; and influ-
ences from organizational goals and norms
(Zsambok 1997; Crichton and Flin 2001; Klein
2008; Doyle and Johnston 2011). Research into
incident management has identiﬁed four distinct
‘naturalistic decision making’ processes seen in
these conditions (Crego and Spinks 1997; Pas-
cual and Henderson 1997; Crichton and Flin
2002): (1) recognition primed and intuition led
action; (2) action based on written or memorized
procedures; (3) analytical comparison of different
options; and (4) creative designing of a novel
course of action; ordered in terms of decreasing
pressure and time commitments.
Within a crisis, an individual decision maker
(whether scientist or emergency manager) may
move along this spectrum of decision processes
depending upon the evolving conditions, and will
not be limited to just one decision making style
(see Martin et al. 1997, p. 283; Doyle and
Johnston 2011). Those operating at a strategic
level should use the analytic style to
accommodate the broader perspective required
under these circumstances (Paton et al. 1998,
1999; Paton and Flin 1999). For those working at
a tactical/coordinating level, an analytical
approach should be adopted in (relatively) high
time, low risk circumstances (such as when
planning courses of action between eruption
episodes and identifying future eruptive scenar-
ios). However, in an eruption phase, rapid deci-
sions need to be taken in minutes, making
adoption of naturalistic decision making styles
essential. For example, in Exercise Ruaumoko
(which simulated the response to the lead up to
an eruption in Auckland; MCDEM 2008;
McDowell 2008), on site science-liaison ofﬁcers
often found themselves having to give almost
instantaneous responses to ofﬁcials during the
peak of the crisis, which would have encouraged
more recognition primed decision making.
Fundamental to all of these decision making
processes, and an effective decision resulting
from those processes, is individual and team
situational awareness (SA, Endsley 1997; Martin
et al. 1997), which is the understanding of the
situation and needs in both time and space. This
encompasses a capacity to use key environmental
cues to comprehend the current situation (in
relation to goals) and to project future status.
Training in this essential competence enhances
the ability of decision makers to anticipate and
make proactive decisions that deal more effec-
tively with emergent issues. During the initial
and on-going situation assessment, individuals
and team members play crucial roles in this
process (Sarna 2002). As stated by Doyle and
Johnston (2011, p. 75), “a decision maker may
make the correct decision based on his or her
perception of the situation, but if his or her sit-
uation assessment is incorrect, this may nega-
tively influence his or her decision (Crichton and
Flin 2002)”. Because the inputs into decision
making can come from different professionals
and/or from team members that may be geo-
graphically dispersed (e.g., in an EOC, and at the
volcano), decision making training must include
the development of distributed decision-making
skills (where the decision-making responsibility
does not lie with a single entity, but rather is
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distributed throughout the responding organisa-
tions; Flin 1996; Paton et al. 1998; Kapucu and
Garayev 2011). For distributed decision making
to work effectively, decision makers must have
some shared meaning (mental model) about the
event and their respective roles in deﬁning and
resolving response problems.
3 Shared Meaning in Multi-agency
Response: Mental Models
An individual’s mental model of a hazard is
deﬁned by Bostrom et al. (2008, p. 308) as “how
people understand and think about the hazard,
and their causal beliefs”. For incident manage-
ment, this represents a mental “map” of the
operating environment. This must encompass
event characteristics and hazard consequences
and each other’s differing needs, responsibilities,
roles, and demands, as well as the interdepen-
dencies that contribute to effective problem
solving and decision making (Rogalski and
Samurçay 1993; Flin 1996; Paton and Jackson
2002). A shared mental model allows a dis-
tributed team to share understanding of the task
at hand, anticipate and proactively respond to
information needs (Lipshitz et al. 2001; Pollock
et al. 2003), and make shared decisions (Orasanu
1994; Salas et al. 1994).
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Fig. 1 Example of the information flow, communication
network and many agencies involved in an eruption, as
observed from the response to the 1995 Ruapehu eruption
by Paton et al. (1999). CAA Civil Aviation Authority;
DOC Department of Conservation; ECNZ Electricity
Corporation of New Zealand; GNS Institute of Geological
and Nuclear Sciences (now GNS Science); MAF Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries
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From an incident management perspective,
the major challenge is the need for participants to
be able to continue to use their “routine” and
“expert” mental models of the constituent hazard
consequences and individual response. These
need to complement an over-arching or
super-ordinate mental model, which is a coop-
erative mental model that integrates individual
mental models that describe their understanding
of: their role within their organisation, how they
relate to others within their organisation, and
their organisation’s role within, and communi-
cation with, the wider response team (see Figs. 1
and 2). It is this super-ordinate model that facil-
itates communication.
3.1 Shared Meaning in Multi-agency
Response: Communication
Information received by emergency managers
from scientists will be considered with respect to
other demands and issues placed on emergency
managers considering the risk to lives, econo-
mies and infrastructure. The communication of
risk information between emergency managers
and the public, or scientists and emergency
managers, is also subject to the mental models
gulf (Morgan et al. 2002). This is where there is a
gap between “what experts know and the plan
they develop, versus what key public know and
prefer” (Heath et al. 2009, p. 129; see also Doyle
et al. 2014a). By minimising this gulf, commu-
nication between advisors and key decision
makers can move from explicit requests for
information (which can result in an increase in
time delays, pressures and stress, impacting
decision making effectiveness—particularly if
reformatting of that information is also required;
Klein 1997; Crichton and Flin 2002) through to
implicit supply of advice by the advisors as they
recognise ahead of time what information the
decision maker needs. Effective teams have been
shown to be dominated by communication styles
such as this (Paton and Flin 1999; Lipshitz et al.
2001; Paton and Jackson 2002; Kowalski-
Trakofler et al. 2003). Table 3 describes the
characteristics of teams that display these effec-
tive communication and advice provision styles.
Implicit communication also facilitates the
maintenance of situational awareness during
periods of dynamic information as it allows
decision makers to focus on task management
(see review in Doyle et al. 2015; Paton and
Jackson 2002; Paton 2003; Wilson et al. 2007;
Owen et al. 2013). For this to occur, these sci-
entists and experts must recognise and under-
stand the needs of the decision makers, as well as
task
hazard & 
consequences
equipment
team interaction 
& interdependecies
time & risk 
pressures
communication
network
available / needed
 information
organisation’s 
role & responsibility
role & responsibility 
in organisation
event 
characteristics
roles, responsibilities 
and needs of others EXAMPLE
INDIVIDUAL
MENTAL
MODELS
individual
individual individual
individual
individual individual
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 2 a Examples of the various mental models within
an individual’s over-arching or super-ordinate mental
model during a volcanic crisis. b A poor shared mental
model between individuals. c A good shared mental
model between individuals
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their timelines and thresholds, supplying infor-
mation that is useful, useable, and used (Rovins
et al. 2014).
During the Ruapehu 1995–1996 eruptions,
comparison of pre-existing networks with infor-
mation providers revealed both incomplete net-
works and inconsistencies with respect to
information sources, in particular with the main
information provider GNS Science (Paton et al.
1998, 1999). This resulted in agencies seeking
information in an ad hoc basis (i.e. through
explicit requests) which would have contributed
to communication difﬁculties, as evidenced by
the 37% of organisations who reported inade-
quate communication during the response (ibid).
One way of mitigating this issue involves advi-
sors developing a capacity to, where possible,
anticipate others information needs (Doyle and
Johnston 2011; Doyle et al. 2015).
Advisors must recognise the very speciﬁc
information and advice needs of decision makers
prior to an event and have procedures in place in
advance of an event to provide that information
in a timely manner directly where it is needed
within the organisational structure. For this to
effectively occur scientists (either as on-site sci-
ence advisors, or off-site expert panels) must not
just be external experts to a multi-agency
response team, but must be considered part of
the extended and distributed team handling the
emergency management response (Doyle and
Johnston 2011). Integrating Science Advisory
Groups (SAGs) into a wider response team offers
the opportunity for technical and scientiﬁc
experts to directly inform effective planning,
intelligence gathering, and decision making of
the emergency personnel and government
ofﬁcials.
The Auckland Volcanic Science Advisory
Group (AVSAG), an example of such a SAG,
was tested during Exercise Ruaumoko (MCDEM
2008; McDowell 2008). From this it was iden-
tiﬁed that the AVSAG process facilitated the
provision of valuable advice in a clear, timely
manner. A clear advantage was the presence of a
science advisor in both the National Crisis
Management Centre and the Auckland Civil
Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM)
Group EOC, maintaining shared situational
awareness between the SAG and the emergency
management team. However, having two on-site
liaison ofﬁcers at different EOCs did result in a
divergence of advice in these two locations at the
peak of the crisis (Cronin 2008), as shared situ-
ational awareness could not be maintained
between them.
These past experiences, through both response
and exercises, has identiﬁed that this SAG
Table 3 Characteristics of teams that display effective communication and advice provision styles during a
multi-agency crisis response
Provision of science advice should
involve (Paton and Jackson 2002;
Paton 2003)
Effective team communication
involves (Wilson et al. 2007;
Owen et al. 2013)
Effective team and interagency
science advice communication
(Doyle et al. 2015)
Anticipation and deﬁnition of
information needs
Accurate and timely information
exchange, correct phraseology and
‘closed-loop’ communication
techniques
Should consider the ability of
diverse stakeholders to interpret data
communicated, and apply to resolve
response issues while operating in a
collaborative environment
Organized networks between
information providers and recipients
Coordinated behaviour based on
shared knowledge, performance
monitoring, back up and
adaptability
Needs the development of a
super-ordinate team identity and the
ability to switch between agency and
shared mental models as required
Established capability to “provide,
access, collate, interpret and
disseminate information compatible
with decision needs and systems”
Co-operative team orientation,
efﬁcacy, trust and cohesion
May involve stakeholders who rarely
interact with one another outside the
context of managing a volcanic
crisis, and so depends on emergent
team dynamics and concepts such as
“swift-trust” (Meyerson et al. 1996)
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approach is beneﬁcial as it provides “one trusted
source” for science information during a crisis
(MCDEM 2008; Smith 2009), facilitates an
integration of a wide range of expert opinions
required to manage uncertainty during decision
making (as recommended by Lipshitz et al.
2001) and can help combat issues that may arise
due to conflict between scientists (Barclay et al.
2008). It also enabled the volcanologists to speak
with “a single voice” to reduce confusion, as
advocated by the IAVCEI protocols (1999).
3.2 Shared Meaning: Uncertainty
If the volcanic crisis environment was perfectly
predictable, the development of the relationships
and competencies discussed above would be a
relatively straightforward task. However, vol-
canic crises present evolving, emergent demands,
and a highly uncertain response environment.
The IAVCEI protocols (1999) highlight that
uncertainty should always be acknowledged.
This raises two issues. Firstly, how uncertainty
should be communicated. Secondly, how uncer-
tainty influences the quality of the relationships
between individuals.
Regarding the ﬁrst, reviews by Doyle et al.
(2014a, b), identiﬁed that there is much discourse
as to whether revealing the uncertainties associ-
ated with a risk assessment will strengthen or
decrease trust in a risk assessor and their mes-
sage, and how it impacts decision-making beha-
viour (Miles and Frewer 2003; Wiedemann et al.
2008). On the one hand, the communication of
uncertainty has been suggested to enhance
credibility and trustworthiness. On the other,
however, studies have suggested that it can
decrease people’s trust and the credibility of the
provider, as it can allow people to justify inaction
or their own agenda, or to perceive the risk as
being higher or lower than it is depending on
their personal attitudes (Johnson and Slovic
1995, 1998; Smithson 1999; Miles and Frewer
2003; Johnson 2003; Wiedemann et al. 2008;
Doyle et al. 2014b). The role of ethics in whether
or not to communicate uncertainty has also
become a focus of recent discussion across
disciplines, including whether communicating
this uncertainty actually enhances or diminishes
the autonomy of the receiver of the message, and
whether it produces an overall beneﬁt or can
actually cause harm (Han 2013; Austin et al.
2015; Grasso and Markowitz 2015). Keohane
et al. (2014) suggest that scientists ‘should
understand their own ethical choices in using
scientiﬁc information to communicate to audi-
ences’ (p. 343), and identify ﬁve principles for
scientiﬁc communication under uncertain condi-
tions: honesty, precision, audience relevance,
process transparency, and speciﬁcation of
uncertainty about conclusions.
To address how to manage and communicate
uncertainty, many disciplines including vol-
canology, climate change, and meteorology
(IAVCEI 1999; Moss and Schneider 2000; Gill
et al. 2008; Mastrandrea et al. 2010; see also
Moss and Schneider 2000; Patt and Dessai 2005;
Budescu et al. 2009; Doyle and Potter 2016),
have established guidelines that advocate the
clear and transparent communication of uncer-
tainty, a documentation of all processes related to
uncertainty, and the use of formalised proba-
bilistic terms and frameworks for assessment and
communication (see Table 4). In volcanology, it
has become increasingly popular to use proba-
bility statements in communications (Doyle et al.
2014a), which involve knowledge of both the
dynamical phenomena and the uncertainties
involved (Sparks 2003). Further, the use of
probabilistic cost beneﬁt analysis and Bayesian
Event Trees has been driven by a desire to make
objective and traceable decisions via quantitative
volcanic risk metrics (Aspinall and Cooke 1998;
Marzocchi and Woo 2007; Woo 2008; Lindsay
et al. 2009).
However, probabilistic statements, whether in
numeric or linguistic formats, can commonly be
misinterpreted because their framing, direction-
ality and probabilistic format can bias people’s
understanding, thereby affecting people’s action
choices (see Fig. 3; e.g., Teigen and Brun 1999;
Karelitz and Budescu 2004; Honda and Yamag-
ishi 2006; Joslyn et al. 2009; Budescu et al.
2009; Lipkus 2010). This has been identiﬁed
as a particular issue in volcanic crisis
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Table 4 A summary of the existing guidelines for communicating uncertainty from the volcanological, weather and
climate change communities
Budescu et al. (2009) • “Make every possible effort to differentiate between the
ambiguity of a target event and its underlying
uncertainty”
• “Specify the various sources of uncertainty underlying
key events and outline their nature and magnitude, to
the degree that this is possible”
• “Use both verbal terms and numerical values to
communicate uncertainty”
• “Adjust the width of the numerical ranges to match the
uncertainty of the target events”
World meteorological ofﬁce (Gill et al. 2008) Uncertainties should be communicated:
• “For improved decision making”—especially when
they have many options available to them, to weigh up
contingencies
• “Helps manage user expectations”—a more open,
honest and effective relationship
• “Promotes user conﬁdence”—If users understand
forecasts have a degree of uncertainty… they can tune
their decision-making to manage this uncertainty …
• “As it reflects the state of science”
Moss and Schneider (2000, p. 37) (as used by the IPCC;
see also Patt and Dessai 2005; Mastrandrea et al. 2010)
• Identify the most important factors and uncertainties
that are likely to affect the conclusions
• Document ranges and distributions in the literature […
the key causes of uncertainty …]
• Make an initial determination of the appropriate level
of precision [… after considering the state of the
science and the nature of the uncertainties…]
• Characterize the distribution of values that a parameter,
variable, or outcome may take
• Using standard terms, rate and describe the state of
scientiﬁc information on which the conclusions and/or
estimates are based
• Prepare a “traceable account” of how the estimates
were constructed
• Use formal probabilistic frameworks for assessing
expert judgment
• Consider target audience and develop a pluralistic
approach (Patt and Dessai 2005):
– Sophisticated part in numeric format
– General chapters using verbal and narrative phrase
– Formalise translation between numerical and verbal
probabilities
IAVCEI (1999) subcommittee for crisis protocols • Uncertainty should be acknowledged
• Forecasts, warnings, and other important public
statements are best when written ﬁrst
• Date-stamped, team-approved hazard maps, together
with their assumptions, should also be entered into the
formal record of warnings. Competing or
uncoordinated, multiple hazards maps are confusing to
the public and should be avoided
• Scientiﬁc caution in the face of uncertainty is good, but
it needs to be balanced against the legitimate
information needs of decision makers and the public at
risk. If the data do not allow a deﬁnitive forecast,
(continued)
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communications (IAVCEI Subcomittee for Crisis
Protocols 1999; Cronin 2008; Haynes et al. 2008;
Solana et al. 2008; McGuire et al. 2009; Doyle
et al. 2014a; Doyle and Potter 2016). Thus sci-
entists communicating in a multi-agency vol-
canic response must consider the best practice
guidelines that have been established across a
range of disciplines to address this issue (see
Table 4).
The second issue regarding uncertainty in a
crisis is its influence on the quality of the rela-
tionships between responding individuals, and
thus the quality of mental models and perfor-
mance, discussed next.
4 People and Organizations
A common thread running through the previous
sections concerned the crucial role shared mental
models played in cooperative action. It is
important to appreciate how organizational and
work-family relationships influence the ease with
which respective agency representatives can
Table 4 (continued)
factual statements about what is known are an
important step. Warnings of serious events that are
known to be possible, issued before such events can be
forecast as probable, may hasten precautions and save
lives
• Use probabilities to calibrate qualitative assessments of
risk. Avoid commonly used adjectives such as “soon”
or “high-” or “low-(risk),” because they mean different
things to different people. Probabilities and
comparisons to familiar non-volcanic risks help to
avert misunderstanding that risk is higher or lower than
it actually is
• Under no circumstances should hazard be intentionally
overstated or understated. Any decision to “err on the
safe side” should be a conscious, openly discussed
decision. Never disregard what seems like a
low-probability, “worst case” event, because such
events can and do occur (e.g., Mount St. Helens and
Pinatubo). Instead, estimate the probabilities of
worst-case and lesser scenarios, as above, to put the
“worst-case scenario” in proper perspective
Doyle et al. (2014a, b) see also the operational
guidelines in Doyle and Potter (2016)
• There is a need to adopt formal numerical and verbal
probability translation tables that are speciﬁc to
volcanology
• If communicating time window forecasts, be consistent
in the use of either “within” or “in” throughout out all
statements, bulletins and reports; particularly for long
window forecast statements where “within the next X
days” has a statistically signiﬁcant different
interpretation to “in the next X days”
• Scientists should make all possible efforts to
communicate forecasts, likelihoods, and probabilities
over a range of relevant time windows, including a
probability forecast for a shorter immediate time
window in particular (such as the ﬁrst 24 h)
• Any formalised communication strategy should be
accompanied by exercises, simulations, and education
programs with both the decision-makers and the public
to help facilitate a greater understanding of the
complexities inherent in these uncertain forecasts
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“participate” in a super-ordinate mental model
and the degree to which they cope with and adapt
to crisis demands (i.e., how organizational fac-
tors influence susceptibility to stress and thus
performance).
4.1 Organizational Characteristics
Organizational characteristics influence the men-
tal models that agency representatives bring to the
crisis management environment. The organiza-
tional socialization (the norms, customs, and
ideologies of that organisation) and the organi-
zational cultural change that occurs when organ-
isations interact, will influence the thinking and
behaviour of people within an organization, as
well as their mental models of communication
between organizations. These processes then spill
over to affect how volcanic crisis events and their
consequences are responded to and interpreted
(Paton et al. 2009; Paton and Norris 2014). The
knowledge and interpretive processes that repre-
sentatives bring to the crisis response role as a
result of their organizational cultural provides the
foundation (capabilities represented by
pre-existing mental models) for their individual
contribution. However, as introduced above, the
need for diverse organizational representatives to
integrate their respective contributions in com-
plementary ways requires the development of a
super-ordinate mental model deﬁned by the col-
lective and multifaceted demands of the crisis
event. The ease with which this can be achieved is
complicated by the fact that this is done in a cli-
mate of uncertainty. Interaction under uncertainty
can result in pre-existing beliefs dominating
which may or may not be amenable to alteration.
This then prevents the development of inter-
agency trust and undermines collective perfor-
mance (Paton et al. 2009). When dealing with
atypical, challenging crisis events, emergency
management representatives, by virtue of the
need for them to play complementary roles in
deﬁning and managing complex events, become
more reliant on others for information and guid-
ance about how to respond.
4.2 Trust
Faced with uncertainty, when decision makers
are reliant on one another for information and
decision making, trust plays a pivotal role in
facilitating sustainable collaboration in
multi-agency crisis response contexts (Siegrist
and Cvetkovich 2000; Mayer et al. 1995). Trust
influences organizational intention to collaborate
and share information between stakeholders
(Mohr and Spekman 1994; Kapucu 2006).
Trust was identiﬁed as a key issue for rela-
tionships between scientists and ofﬁcials during
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et al. 2014b, after the graphical abstract of Doyle et al. 2014a)
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the eruptions of Soufriere Hills Volcano,
Montserrat, WI, where Haynes et al. (2007)
identiﬁed that this trust was influenced by a
number of factors including: competence; integ-
rity; value similarity; openness; and conflicting
messages of safety and danger. Trust in the sci-
entists was based upon high perceived reliability,
competence, openness and integrity; while trust
in government authorities was based upon high
perceived levels of competence, reliability, and
fairness.
The diversity of, for example, agencies,
organizational cultures and operating practices
brought together into a crisis management envi-
ronment, and the need for diverse volcanic haz-
ard consequences to be managed by agency
representatives that differ in levels of familiarity
with each other, can threaten the degree to which
crisis management activities are characterized by
trust (Dietz et al. 2010). In part, this reflects the
lack of familiarity between interacting agencies.
It is also influenced by how organizational cul-
tural characteristics ingrained in routine work,
such as hierarchical reporting practices and levels
of bureaucracy (including command and control
expectations), influence the relationships that
emerge in an inter-agency crisis management
context (Dietz et al. 2010; Dirks and Ferrin
2001).
Scientists tend to bring experience of working
in organizational cultures that emerge in flatter,
more organic organizational cultures in which
information flow is common. This makes it easier
for them to engage in practices that focus on
sharing information and building trust. However,
representatives from government departments
and emergency services agencies, whose routine
culture is characterized by generally higher levels
of hierarchical relationships and reporting, tend
to be predisposed towards maintaining their own
agency-based independence. This fosters an
emergent culture of rivalry among organizations
in ways that work against information sharing
between agencies during a crisis (Waugh and
Streib 2006; Iannella and Henricksen 2007;
Marcus et al. 2006; Marincioni 2007). Further-
more, these predisposing cultural features can
result in relationships that are characterized by
in- and out-group differentiation. These in- and
out- groups then affect the quality of information
flow and increases the likelihood of information
being restricted to members within their own
organization (or includes those with whom they
are familiar), rather than sharing information
across all stakeholders (Militello et al. 2007;
Owen 2013).
These factors interact to not only constrain
information flow, but in the process, introduce
signiﬁcant challenges to the development of the
level of trust required for effective collaboration
and decision making under conditions of uncer-
tainty (McKnight et al. 1988; Banai and Reisel
1999; Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000). Thus the
agency representatives brought together for
response needs may not have the mutual inter-
action experiences needed to forge trust in each
other, with aspects such as cultural diversity
adding to this challenge. Thus, there is an
important need to develop trust in situ while
responding in a high demand environment.
If trust is absent, those working in an EOC
setting are more likely to focus on task demands
in ways that reflect their core expertise and nor-
mal operating practices, rather than functional
collaboration in ways that ensure they work in
complementary ways to resolve multi-faceted
response problems (Pollock et al. 2003). This
reduces their capacity to contribute effectively to
the emerging needs of the response (Pollock et al.
2003). The dynamic, prolonged nature of vol-
canic crisis response thus requires different ways
of ensuring the development of trust. The con-
cept of swift trust represents an approach to trust
building in situations where people must col-
laborate on complex, evolving volcanic crisis
tasks under high risk, low time constraints that
preclude the development of trust through nor-
mal means (Goodman and Goodman 1976;
Meyerson et al. 1996; Hyllengren et al. 2011;
Faraj and Xiao 2006; Robert et al. 2009; Lester
and Vogelgesang 2012; Crisp and Jarvenpaa
2013).
For swift trust to develop, “team” members
must be assigned speciﬁc roles (that align with
key response issues and needs) in the temporary
work group (Meyerson et al. 1996). This can be
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facilitated by establishing a super-ordinate men-
tal model that makes the key contributions of all
agencies to effective whole-of-incident manage-
ment clear. It can be developed pre-event via use
of techniques such as cross training in organi-
zational crisis management training (Blickens-
derfer et al. 1998). Second, swift trust emerges if
members are informed that there is a high like-
lihood of future collaboration (in incident
reviews, simulations) with those with whom they
are collaborating (Goodman and Goodman 1976;
Meyerson et al. 1996). Finally, swift trust
develops by ensuring that all participants identify
that success relates to the super-ordinate man-
agement as much as it does to how they con-
tribute their personal expertise (Curnin et al.
2015). This developmental task focuses on how
the input of different representatives is necessary
to develop a holistic response to multifaceted
demands that exceed the expertise of any one
agency. Doing so facilitates role clariﬁcation, and
increases the capacity of team members to
understand that each stakeholder brings to the
collective task, their specialist skills and knowl-
edge as required to fulﬁl one of several specialist
roles in the multi-agency team (Kramer 1999).
This, in turn, enables the development and per-
formance of collaborative working practices and
supports emergent multi-agency coordination.
4.3 Work-Family
Another element that has a signiﬁcant bearing on
people’s stress management and performance in
high risk settings and that has not been consid-
ered in volcanic crisis response contexts concerns
how “work-family” relationships affect how well
people cope with working in high risk, high
stress contexts (Paton and Norris 2014). Orga-
nizations that take steps to facilitate family
involvement in the employment experience, for
their personnel who work in high risk settings,
record better communication and trust between
personnel and management, and thus more
effective stress management in high risk work
settings. Family involvement includes, for
example, providing support services for partners
and children when personnel are deployed, pro-
viding regular updates for partners and other
family members when personnel are deployed,
providing roles (e.g., administrative roles, media
liaison roles) and setting up peer support pro-
grams for partners (Paton and Kelso 1991; Paton
and Norris 2014). In contrast, in organizations
where these kinds of family engagements are not
offered, factors such as lack of information about
what is happening in the ﬁeld, and the resultant
increased anxiety amongst family members, will
increase perceived psychological stress in part-
ners and children and lessens their availability
and effectiveness as support resources for per-
sonnel deployed to deal with volcanic crises
(Paton et al. 2009). Awareness of these issues is
imperative for volcanic crisis response, where
responding scientists may be geographically
dispersed and away from family during periods
of high risk and high stress work. Under such
circumstances, ensuring partners are involved as
much as possible to facilitate opportunities for
personnel to remain connected with family, and
access social support from this quarter, can pro-
vide cost-effective stress management resources
for those deployed (Paton and Kelso 1991). This
aspect of a comprehensive crisis management
strategy plays a key role in supporting perfor-
mance and well-being, particularly when per-
sonnel can be deployed and working in high
demand, high stress contexts over prolonged
periods of time.
5 Concluding Remarks: Developing
Future Response Capacity
We have highlighted how good shared mental
models of the response situation between indi-
viduals within and across organisations, charac-
terised by good situational awareness, strong
inter-organisational networks, and high trust
between responding organisations and individu-
als, have been shown to enhance communication
and thus decision making. However, developing
and maintaining such shared mental models is
itself an important task. Research has shown that
shared experience, through training, can help
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improve the quality of such mental models
(Cannon-Bowers and Bell 1997; Crego and
Spinks 1997; Paton et al. 2000; Pliske et al.
2001; Borodzicz and van Haperen 2002).
Ideally, multi-organisational and
multi-disciplinary planning activities, collabora-
tive exercises and simulations should be under-
taken with all team members and advisors to help
in the development of similar mental models of
the task (see review in Paton and Jackson 2002;
Doyle and Johnston 2011; Doyle et al. 2015).
A comprehensive suite of training and relation-
ship building activities prior to an event, and a
detailed analysis of event and exercise response,
can help enhance this future response capability
and identify areas for improvement. This is par-
ticularly important given the rarity of volcanic
and other hazard events, and thus a lack of
opportunity for real world experience. This
training and exercising needs to develop both
individual and team situational awareness and
explore how and when each is appropriate for
response, within evolving, dynamic response
environments (Doyle et al. 2015). Team situa-
tional awareness can be developed in post-event
and post-exercise reviews that include identify-
ing inter-agency relationship issues as opportu-
nities for development (and not as problems).
Through the analysis of past events, lessons for
successful communication, advice provisions and
distributed decision-making can also be learnt.
The above processes describe group learning
from crises, exercises and training, which is
identiﬁed by Borodzicz and van Haperen (2002)
to occur along three dimensions: personal,
interpersonal, and institutional. Several training
methods have been identiﬁed that can enhance
naturalistic decision-making (Cannon-Bowers
and Bell 1997), enhance decision skills (Pliske
et al. 2001), train effective teams (Salas et al.
1997), and develop effective critical incident and
team based simulations (Flin 1996; Crego and
Spinks 1997) all of which are relevant for vol-
canologists and scientiﬁc advisory groups. These
include cross training, positional rotation, sce-
nario planning, collaborative exercises and sim-
ulations, shared exercise writing tasks including
co-writing, swapped writing and ‘train the
trainer’ type tasks, in addition to workshops,
seminars and speciﬁc knowledge sharing activi-
ties (Doyle and Johnston 2011; Doyle et al.
2015).
Adopting such an evaluative approach has
greatly enhanced the response environment in
New Zealand, resulting in a formation of a
number of scientiﬁc advisory groups with for-
malised Terms of Reference, protocols for com-
munication and networking with emergency
management and key response organisations
(e.g., CPVAG 2009). These, accompanied by
regular workshops and meetings to facilitate
relationship building and shared understanding,
will help improve the communication and infor-
mation flow and thus the shared situational
awareness in a crisis. Being part of an exercise
schedule (i.e. Exercise Ruaumoko; MCDEM
2008), also provided Auckland CDEM and the
associated science agencies a focus to develop
the Auckland Volcanic Science Advisory Group
structure, including arranging formal contract
agreements for the participating scientists
(McDowell 2008; Cronin 2008).
The development of formalised protocols,
Terms of Reference and the use of established
guidelines for response and communication
(such as those issued by IAVCEI, WMO, and
IPCC; IAVCEI 1999; Gill et al. 2008; Mastran-
drea et al. 2010) can greatly enhance response
processes by reducing ambiguity about ‘what to
do’, ‘what to communicate’, ‘how to communi-
cate’, and ‘who to communicate to’, particularly
in high stress, high pressure, high consequence
events. As stated by IAVCEI (1999), responding
scientists must also identify a team plan for crisis
response (Table 5), and we suggest that such
plans and procedures should be tested prior to an
event. Simulations should aim to reproduce
reality as closely as possible, reflecting the real-
ities of advisory processes in turbulent conditions
(Rosenthal and ’t Hart 1989; Borodzicz and van
Haperen 2002). However, evaluation of exercises
and events must minimise the risk of creating an
optimistic bias that overestimates future response
preparedness and capability (Paton et al. 1998).
In conclusion, it is also important for future
work to consider the role that international
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frameworks and initiatives will have on any pro-
tocols and procedures developed for volcanic
science advisors at a local or national level. For
example, recently the UN Ofﬁce for Disaster Risk
Reduction’s Hyogo Framework for Action
(HFA) 2005–2015 (United Nations International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) 2007)
has been reviewed. Changes include a reconsid-
eration of the role of science and technology, the
role of local science and local knowledge, and the
role of international science advice mechanisms as
ratiﬁed in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR: UNISDR 2015).
Volcanologists must be aware of the impact of any
changes to international frameworks such as the
HFA and the SFDRR, as they will affect regional
and local frameworks and support, including both
funding, resources, and the legitimacy of any
formalised local approaches that may be devel-
oped to maintain “shared meaning” with stake-
holders during a volcanic crisis.
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